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Wages, Work, Privilege, and Legal Education
Gene R. Nichol*
In an earlier life, it was my singular fortune to do political work with
the late United States Senator from Minnesota, Paul Wellstone.  Paul argued,
across the nation, that our greatest shortcoming as a people was a growing
willingness to “turn our gaze away” from those locked at the bottom of
American life.1  Perhaps our children were doing well, and our friends’ chil-
dren, and even their children’s children.  We understood, no doubt, that life
could be a good deal tougher, maybe impossibly so, for lots of others.  But
they lived across the tracks, or across the state, or across the country from
us.  We suspected their hardship, and maybe if we saw it close-up we would
even have deemed it unacceptable, incapable of being squared with the
American promise.  But we were not forced to face it.  We simply averted
our eyes to more tolerable terrain.  We could consider ourselves “one na-
tion,” “under God,” replete with “liberty and justice for all.”  It was just
crucial to cast “our gaze” in the right direction.
This willful blindness, Wellstone argued, enabled a vibrant and boastful
democracy to take the economic travails of so many low-wage working
Americans off the agenda of both major political parties.  Poor and near-
poor2 citizens constitute the “disappeared” of our politics—state and fed-
eral.3  In times of economic growth and broader prosperity, they are largely
invisible as we assume, despite many facts to the contrary,4 that a rising tide
will lift all boats.  In times of recession and broad hardship, we focus, oddly,
on Wall Street, bankers, and hedge fund magnates as bellwethers of our
longed-for recovery.  But those who cause economic devastation often es-
cape its woundings.  They typically manage, either by speculation or prof-
fered subsidy, even to prosper from the economy’s downturns.  Come hell or
come high water, the interests of those at the bottom register only lightly,
rhetorically.  We rarely govern with poor Americans in the lens.
It is well to ask, then, as this Symposium does, whether we might de-
velop, post-recession, a political and legal agenda more congenial to low-
* Professor of Law and Director, Center on Poverty, Work and Opportunity, University of
North Carolina; President Emeritus, College of William & Mary.
1 See generally Gene R. Nichol, America’s Economic (and Legal) Apartheid: We Simply
Turn Our Gaze Away from the Problems of the Poor, MONT. LAW MAG., Dec. 5, 2003, at 5.
2 The term “poor” can be used as a rough approximation to describe those living below
the federal poverty standard—or about $22,000 a year for a family of four. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, POVERTY THRESHOLDS FOR 2009 BY SIZE OF FAMILY AND NUMBER OF RELATED CHIL-
DREN UNDER 18 YEARS (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/
threshld/thresh09.xls.
3 See, e.g., LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY 252–54 (2008).
4 See, e.g., Joint Legislative Study Commission on Poverty Reduction and Economic Re-
covery, 2008 Gen. Assemb., 2008 Sess. (N.C. 2008) (testimony of Gene R. Nichol), available
at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/poverty/nicholtestimony_povertycommission.pdf (dis-
cussing the rise of poverty in North Carolina from 2000 to 2008).
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income working people.  Like Yogi Berra, I am not one for prognostication.
But there is great room, and great call, for economic policies and practices
more potently designed—through employment, wage enhancement, tax re-
lief, and essential social-services support—to lift the prospects of those fac-
ing the most acute hardship and most daunting barriers to meaningful
opportunity.  After briefly describing the impacts of the last two years of
massive economic downturn, I will explore an array of policies directed to-
ward a more broadly shared prosperity.  And with the reader’s grace, I won’t
stop there.
In the second half of this short essay, I will turn closer to home.  I
inquire whether some of the claims of economic bias and privilege cast so
accurately at our politics might also be directed, with validity and justifica-
tion, at our own efforts in the legal academy.  I ask, consistent with the
recent, potent challenge of a national labor leader, whether we work in this
arena more readily as “critics” or as “servants” of “economic privilege.”5  I
argue that it is difficult to be satisfied with an honest answer to that query.
I. A SEVERE (AND RISING) AMERICAN ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
The nation is beginning, at least fitfully, to emerge from one of the
most devastating economic slides in our history.  Following a fraud-, theft-,
and greed-induced meltdown of the financial sector, we have experienced
the highest rates of unemployment in a half century.  Sixteen million of us
are, at present, out of work.6  Another nine million, against preference, are
relegated to part-time employment.7  Shattering losses of health care cover-
age, so often tied to available and secure jobs, have escalated.8
Massive wealth and pension assets have disappeared.  Long-earned re-
tirements are being deferred or abandoned.  Access to needed credit and in-
vestment has been radically diminished.  Those who produce or manufacture
are thus potently burdened—in favor of those who speculate, often betting
against the tide of our broader progress.  Residential and commercial fore-
closure has been epidemic.  Whole communities, usually disproportionately
populated by persons of color, have been debilitated or financially drowned.9
The foundational value of the central and buffeting asset owned by many
5 See Richard L. Trumka, Why Working People are Angry and Why Politicians Should
Listen, Remarks at the Harvard Kennedy School (Apr. 7, 2010) (transcript available at http://
thepage.time.com/remarks-trumkas-harvard-speech).
6 ECON. POLICY INST., AMERICAN JOBS PLAN: A FIVE POINT PLAN TO STEM THE U.S. JOBS
CRISIS 3 (Tom Kiley ed., 2009).
7 Id.
8 See, e.g., CTR. ON POVERTY, WORK AND OPPORTUNITY, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL,
DOCUMENTING POVERTY, ECONOMIC DISTRESS AND CHALLENGE IN NORTH CAROLINA 11
(2010), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/poverty/publications/documenting
poverty_finalreport.pdf.
9 See, e.g., Michael Powell, Blacks in Memphis Lose Decades of Economic Gains, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2010, at A1.
2011] Wages, Work, Privilege, and Legal Education 403
low- and middle-income Americans—their home—has been compromised
and often worse.
The Department of Agriculture reports that astonishing numbers of us
are “food insecure.”10  One in eight uses food stamps.11  Family homeless-
ness has risen by thirty percent.12  Over one in five kids lives in stark, unre-
lenting poverty.13  And the numbers are far worse for black, Latino, and
Native American children.14  Racial wealth disparities, long daunting, have
exploded.15  Meanwhile, Wall Street financiers receive government bailouts
and use these tax dollars grudgingly wrung from waitresses and coal miners
to fund bonuses16 more patently pornographic than anything ever envisioned
under the Miller obscenity standard.17  Anger—real and created, justified
and trumped up, direct and displaced, perilous and pretend, beleaguered and
bigoted—roils.  We have created an astonishing hole out of which we must
dig ourselves, and it is not clear that we trust those holding the shovels to
accomplish the task.  As a result, progress will, no doubt, be slow, and the
light above the horizon will likely remain flickering and dim for some
time.18
10 Food Security in the United States, U.S. Department of Agriculture (Nov. 16, 2009),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FoodSecurity/ (on file with the Harvard Law School Li-
brary) (“In 2009, 85 percent of U.S. households were food secure throughout the entire year,
and 14.7 percent of households were food insecure at least some time during that year, essen-
tially unchanged from 14.6 percent in 2008.”); see also John Quinterno, Rising Caseloads:
Severe Recession Fuels Dramatic Growth in Food Stamp Program, BTC BRIEF (N.C. Justice
Ctr.), May 19, 2009, available at http://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default/files/2009-FNS%20
Caseload%20Brief.pdf.
11 Rev. Jesse Jackson, Congress Ignores Nation’s Job Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST (June 8,
2010, 9:05 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rev-jesse-jackson/congress-ignores-nations
_b_604126.html.
12 Tony Pugh, Report Finds 30% More Homeless Families Since 2007, RALEIGH NEWS
AND OBSERVER, June 17, 2010, at 5A (discussing U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development’s 2009 Homeless Assessment Report).
13 CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE U.S.: 2009, at 16, 22 (2010), available at http://www.
census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60-238.pdf.
14 Id.
15 See Powell, supra note 9; INSIGHT CTR. FOR CMTY. ECON. DEV., LIFTING AS WE CLIMB
(2010), available at http://www.insightcced.org/uploads/CRWG/LiftingAsWeClimb-Women
Wealth-Report-InsightCenter-Spring2010.pdf; CTR. ON POVERTY, WORK AND OPPORTUNITY,
UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, RACIAL WEALTH DISPARITY IN NORTH CAROLINA (2010),
available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/poverty/publications/racial_wealth_disparity_
in_nc_unc_cpwo.pdf; see also Gene R. Nichol, Toward a People’s Constitution: How Demo-
cratic is the American Constitution?, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 621 (2003).
16 Wall Street Bonuses Leap 17 Percent, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 24, 2010, at
3A.
17 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (providing the standards for defining
obscenity).
18 See, e.g., Christopher Rugaber, Companies Hire 67,000 Workers, But Jobless Rate
Rises, RALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER, Sept. 2, 2010, at A1 (“[H]iring has been weak for four
straight months . . . . [A]nalysts expect economic growth to be tepid for the rest of the year.”);
Bob Herbert, The Horror Show, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2010, at A19 (arguing that government
is not responding to “full-blown unemployment crisis”); Paul Krugman, The Feckless Fed,
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Still, as improvement beckons, one hopes that our future processes and
policies will more clearly focus on the development of an economy that
works for us all, one that embraces a heightened concern for those most
routinely imperiled and jeopardized in our risky economic pecking order—
the bottom third of American life, those who frequently work harder, with
less return, than the bulk of us.19
The American economic landscape, though, is not just one of hardship;
it is also a portrait of rank and imposing unfairness.  The wealthiest nation
on earth, the richest nation in human history, allows shocking numbers of its
members to live in severe poverty.20  Income inequality has risen to levels
that mock our claimed commitments to equal dignity and citizenship.21  We
lead, if that is the correct term, the advanced industrial nations in economic
disparity.22  It is not a close competition.  One scholar has noted that our
“income inequality doubles the levels of most European societies,”23 while
the top one percent earns a quarter of all our income and the top ten percent
rakes in half.24  Another editorialist notes that the richest one percent “own
financial wealth six times greater than the financial wealth of the entire bot-
tom eighty percent” combined.25  We are beyond top heavy.26
Political officials of both parties have embraced breathtaking and even
radical steps to rescue our wealthiest financiers from peril, altering founda-
tional economic presuppositions and underpinnings in the process.  The
longstanding plight of millions of chronically poor and burdened Americans,
on the other hand, has triggered no such emergency agenda.  It has, for us,
long resided snugly within the scope of accepted, natural, and nondiscomfit-
ing realities.
A 2005 study of the world’s most affluent democracies found that “the
United States stands out as the one country in which increased market ine-
quality [in the latter half of the 20th century] did not produce any increase
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2010, at A17 (“[N]ot only is unemployment disastrously high, but most
forecasts say that it will stay very high for years.”).
19 See generally KATHERINE NEWMAN & ELISABETH JACOBS, WHO CARES? PUBLIC AMBIV-
ALENCE AND GOVERNMENT ACTIVISM FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE SECOND GILDED AGE
(2010) (arguing that progress in social legislation requires strong presidential leadership in the
face of public disapproval or ambivalence).
20 See DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 13, at 14 fig.4 (showing that 43.6 million
Americans were in poverty in 2009).
21 See BARTELS, supra note 3, at 283–84.
22 See Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev., Country Note: United States, in GROWING
UNEQUAL?: INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND POVERTY IN OECD COUNTRIES 1 (2008), available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/2/41528678.pdf (showing that U.S. income inequality and poverty
rates are the highest among advanced nations).
23 Kenneth A. Dodge, Op-Ed., Make CEOs Help the Little Guy, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Feb.
7, 2010, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/10038/1033820-109.stm.
24 Id.
25 Nicholas Kristof, A Modest Proposal: A King and Queen for America, N.Y. TIMES, June
8, 2010, at A31.
26 See ROBERT B. REICH, AFTERSHOCK: THE NEXT ECONOMY AND AMERICA’S FUTURE
32–38 (2010) (arguing that American economic inequality has become so pronounced that it
threatens our economic vibrancy).
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in redistribution.”27  Ten of the eleven nations studied witnessed dramatic
increases in income and wealth inequality over the past three decades.  In
each, except the United States, greater chasms of inequality produced more
significant steps towards redistribution.28  While social scientists were prov-
ing that unequal societies produce poorer health, greater conflict, and in-
creased violence among their members, we remained unmoved.29
We consistently talk about a defining and constitutive commitment to
equality.  We pledge our allegiance and dedicate our fates to it, rhetorically.
But we do a good deal less to actually bring it about.  We seem to move
mountains and shove aside claimed central tenets of competitive capitalism
to secure the ascendancy of the already economically privileged.  But those
lodged at the bottom of the ladder are expected to endure hardship, forgo
opportunity, jeopardize family security, and abandon investment in their
children’s futures in order to navigate the shoals of recession caused by the
adventurism of their betters.  One can call such a regime many things.  But
fair and democratic and equal are not likely among them.
II. A BROADENED AGENDA—LETTING THOSE AT THE BOTTOM COUNT
It is not hard to outline at least some steps that could be pursued at both
the federal and state levels of government to offer those mired at the bottom
a better shot at working their way out of debilitating hardship and poverty.
The first, and surely most central, efforts concern employment.  As we crawl
toward economic expansion, even optimistic estimates assume that unem-
ployment will stay well above eight percent for at least another half dec-
ade.30  For perspective, an eight percent official jobless rate is higher than
anything we had witnessed in the twenty-five years prior to 2009.31  The
economy presently shows little ability to create jobs at anything like the rate
and the levels we need to become fully utilized.32
The effects of high unemployment are hugely corrosive.  It ushers in
tides of human calamity.  Families buckle under the strain.  Marriages fail,
27 See Lane Kenworthy & Jonas Pontusson, Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistri-
bution in Affluent Countries, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 449, 459 (2005).
28 Id.
29 See generally RICHARD WILKINSON, THE IMPACT OF INEQUALITY: HOW TO MAKE SICK
SOCIETIES HEALTHIER (2005) (comparing U.S. with other market democracies to demonstrate
that economic inequality leads to potent social stress and mistrust).
30 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, A Very Deep Hole, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2010, at A23; Krugman,
supra note 18 (claiming that analysts predict high unemployment in United States for years to
come).
31 Chris Isidore, Unemployment Hits 25-Year High, CNNMONEY.COM (Mar. 6, 2009,
11:29 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/06/news/economy/jobs_february/index.htm (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library).
32 See, e.g., Herbert, supra note 18 (“The economy is showing absolutely no sign of coun-
tering the nation’s staggering jobs deficit.”).
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abuse rises, children are neglected, and homelessness escalates.33  Depres-
sion, addiction, and despair frequently follow.  Workers lose both confidence
and capability.  Young women and men can’t afford to go to college.  Those
who do go to college face demoralizing job prospects upon graduation—
constrained markets that are likely to mar the trajectory of their careers for
years.  Wages are depressed even for those who aren’t cast aside.  En-
trepreneurial energy succumbs to fear.  Needed investment in research and
development is deferred.  Instead, we move to eat our seed corn.  We be-
come more fragile as a society and more broadly jeopardized, more lastingly
scarred.34  As Jesse Jackson has put it, “Our 10 percent unemployment is a
national emergency, not an acceptable condition.”35  Public sector invest-
ments in infrastructure, transportation, and educational facilities would help
to fill the gap of under-utilization.36  Tax credits for private sector job crea-
tion are crucial as well.37  Chronic, elevated unemployment may suit the
fancy of some investors and various low-wage employers, but it is not a
tolerable policy for a society looking to the prospects of all its members.  We
“cannot allow joblessness on this scale to fester.”38
Other actions would aid low-wage workers, once employed, to more
effectively lift themselves from poverty.  The Federal Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC), created in part to offset the often-regressive impacts of Social
Security and payroll taxes,39 has proven to be a successful tool in rewarding
work.40  A hard look at the disparate American wage structure—where the
average compensation for a chief executive officer of an S&P 500 company
is over $10 million annually, 300 times the average employee compensation
in those companies41—suggests that the EITC could be gainfully increased
33 See Pugh, supra note 12 (claiming number of homeless families has risen 30% in past
two years).
34 See Katherine Newsome & David Padulla, Economic Inequality, NATION, July 19–26,
2010, at 17 (“Scarring is produced by biographies that are deemed deviant or suspect: long
periods of unemployment, jobs with fewer responsibilities than one’s education should lead to
and the like.”).
35 Jackson, supra note 11.
36 ECON. POLICY INST., supra note 6, at 12–13.
37 E.g., id. at 16–17.
38 Herbert, supra note 18, at A25 (quoting Charles McMillion, the president and chief
economist of MBG Information Services as stating, “[w]hen you combine the long-term un-
employed with those who are dropping out and those who are working part-time because they
can’t find anything else, it is just far beyond anything we’ve seen in the job market since the
1930s.”).
39 ANTONIO AVALOS & SEAN ALLEY, NEW AM. FOUND., LEFT ON THE TABLE 4 (2010),
available at http://www.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Left_on_the_
table_NewAmerica.pdf (“Congress originally approved the tax credit legislation in 1975 in
part to offset the burden of Social Security taxes and provide an incentive to work.”).
40 See id. at 5; cf. PETER EDELMAN ET AL., GEORGETOWN CTR. ON POVERTY, INEQUALITY
AND PUB. POLICY, EXPANDING THE EITC TO HELP MORE LOW-WAGE WORKERS 3–6 (2009),
available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001341_eitc.pdf (suggesting that the EITC
has created an incentive for low-income women with children to increasingly enter the
workforce).
41 Dodge, supra note 23.
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and expanded.42  State analogs have also proven beneficial—though fewer
than half of state governments offer a local EITC.43  Equally important, both
state and federal programs could be improved to assure that much higher
percentages of low-income workers, eligible for the credits, actually take the
steps necessary to secure them.  Too many poor families, and their often-
distressed communities, leave these crucial resources on the table,
unclaimed.44
Debates of recent months have again shown an essential need to bolster
our tattered economic safety net.  Ample and secure unemployment compen-
sation,45  temporary assistance with still-necessary COBRA46 payments for
those who lose employer-provided health care coverage, and federal food
assistance are crucial cornerstones for a society of astonishing core wealth
that believes in the dignity of its displaced members.  The costs of these
efforts, and an expanded EITC, could be largely and satisfyingly met with
the introduction of a long-overdue federal sales tax on the transfer of various
financial assets—similar to what occurs in Great Britain.47  A financial trans-
actions tax would, of course, be hugely progressive; the wealthiest ten per-
cent of United States households have over forty-five times the mean
financial holdings of the poorest seventy-five percent.48
A society concerned with massive and debilitating economic inequality
would also make the Social Security system less regressive by lifting the cap
on payroll taxes.  It would ensure, as well, that our largest governmental
housing subsidies don’t flow so dominantly to those with the biggest and
most expensive homes via the mortgage interest tax deduction.  If there is
anything good about having a set of economic and political structures heav-
ily stacked in favor of the wealthiest among us, it is, perhaps, that it is not
hard to find room for improvement.
42 See, e.g., DANIEL P. GITTERMAN, ET AL., CTR. ON POVERTY, WORK AND OPPORTUNITY,
UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, EXPANDING THE EITC FOR SINGLE WORKERS AND COUPLES
WITHOUT CHILDREN 36 (2007), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/poverty/
publications/gittermanpolicybrief.pdf.
43 See INST. ON TAXATION AND ECON. POLICY, REWARDING WORK THROUGH EARNED IN-
COME TAX CREDITS (2009), available at http://www.itepnet.org/pdf/pb15eitc.pdf (noting that
twenty-two states, including the District of Columbia, offer a state EITC—though in eight
states the credit is less than ten percent of the federal credit).
44 See AVALOS & ALLEY, supra note 39, at 6–9.
45 At the time of writing, such compensation currently falls short of adequate. See gener-
ally Editorial, The Unemployed Held Hostage, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2010, at A28 (noting that
325,000 workers were cut off of unemployment compensation in first two weeks of June
2010).
46 See generally FAQs For Employees About COBRA Continuation Health Coverage, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq_consumer_cobra.html (on file with the
Harvard Law School Library).
47 ECON. POLICY INST., supra note 6, at 18–19 (suggesting a 0.5 percent financial transac-
tions tax).
48 Id. at 19.
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III. LOOKING MORE BROADLY, LOOKING WITHIN: THE LEGAL ACADEMY
AND ECONOMIC PRIVILEGE
Changing public policies in order to assure that government, purport-
edly dependent on the consent of the governed, does not systematically ig-
nore the economic interests of the majority is beyond crucial.  So steps like
those I’ve described above are vital—more important, no doubt, than any-
thing I’ll move to pinpoint now.  Still, it would be a mistake, in my judg-
ment, not to take advantage of the rare opportunity to contribute to a
distinguished American law review symposium, dedicated to economic fair-
ness for working people, by looking somewhat more broadly than any par-
ticular set of proffered policy proposals.  That is especially true, I think,
when presented with the chance to explore analogous questions of the cen-
trality of economic justice, for law students and professors, somewhat closer
to home.
One way to do that, particularly in this journal, is to highlight a telling
speech given at Harvard University a few months ago by Richard Trumka,
president of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIO).49  Trumka noted, and emphasized, the growing
anger of ordinary Americans, an anger that now, too frequently, turns to
polarization and bigotry, between self-described real patriots and despised
others, between those who belong and those who don’t.50  Given the locale, it
was perhaps unsurprising that Trumka called for a bold “alliance between
working people and public minded intellectuals.”51  For surely, in his view, a
platform directed toward sustaining, high-wage jobs—rejecting mass unem-
ployment and grotesque inequality—is within our ken.  A program “other
than the dead-end choice between the failed agenda of greed and the voices
of hate and division” is central to democratic progress.52  We need, Trumka
argued, “public intellectuals who will help design the policies that will re-
place the bubble economy with a real, sustainable economy  that works for
all of us.”53  Ultimately, you “cannot fight hatred with greed.”54
Most pointed, for our purposes, was Trumka’s central challenge: “At
this moment of economic pain and anger, political intellectuals face a great
choice—whether to be servants or critics of economic privilege.”55  Servants
or critics.  Tough words.
I am not as young as I used to be.  I am unable, therefore, to give full
purchase to such stark dichotomy.  Life, economics, law, politics, and even
equality are too complex, too contingent, too contradictory for that.  Still,
49 Trumka, supra note 5.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id.
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even here, in the theoretically more activist legal academy, there is too much
truth in Trumka’s claim—and in its implicit suggestion that our default posi-
tion, our status quo, is work in the service of economic privilege.  We con-
sider ourselves, after all, among the leading students and critical exponents
of our varied substantive and procedural fields and disciplines.  No assump-
tion goes unchallenged, no predisposition unexposed.  Our classroom
processes turn on channeled and long-honed practices of skepticism.  Stu-
dents learn a cautious and testy semi-sophistication.  We are, in theory, un-
willing to take any previously-ordained regime for granted.  No squishiness,
no untested hegemony reigns here.  Our scholarship purports to probe be-
yond the facile habits of bench and bar—drawing on the varied disciplines
of the academy to question the standards, applications, predispositions, and
ideologies of law.  Surely, the distortions and dominances of economic privi-
lege remain securely, and keenly, within our sights.
It doesn’t seem so.  We spend, I can attest, endless hours on a curricu-
lum of agreement and expectation, wrongdoing and regulation, taxation and
finance, governmental powers and limitations—and the tattered rules and
practices that accompany them.  The framework is not markedly different
than it was generations ago.  Yet we dedicate shockingly little time and en-
ergy to examining the actors who control the systems we study.  Law firms,
lobbyists, activists, corporate advocates, regulators, financiers, and the deft
turns they execute—the questions of power behind the implementation of all
purported legal regimes—largely escape our focus.  I would not make the
claim that our practices and pedagogies led to the brutal economic inequali-
ties that mark our fortunes.  We are too insignificant a cast of players for
that.  But even a quick examination of our patterns reveals that we too play a
part in the marginalization and exclusion of economically disenfranchised
Americans.  And even if we choose not to think about it, we perform a good
deal more readily and more frequently as friends and apologists for eco-
nomic privilege than as counterweights and opponents to its ascendancy.
We do more to thwart equality than to advance it.
A. Political Outcomes and Legal Legitimacy
To offer an obvious example, two years ago Larry Bartels published a
highly-regarded study entitled, “Unequal Democracy: The Political Econ-
omy of the New Gilded Age.”56  In it, he demonstrated that the “views of
poor people have no direct effect on the behavior of Democrats or Republi-
cans after they get elected” to the United States Senate.57  Senators showed
an “utter lack of responsiveness to the views of millions of people whose
56 BARTELS, supra note 3.
57 Id. at 282 (but noting the “indirect effect of public opinion through the electoral pro-
cess,” since “the differences in voting behavior between Democratic and Republican senators
representing similar constituents are substantial.”).
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only distinguishing characteristic is their low incomes.”58  Economic ine-
quality, Bartels claimed, “has pervasive, corrosive effects on political repre-
sentation and policy making in contemporary America.”59  In Aristotelian
terms, he concluded, “our political system seems to be functioning not as a
‘democracy’ but as an ‘oligarchy.’” 60  It is perhaps understandable, therefore,
that we take fewer steps to ameliorate economic hardship than our interna-
tional peers.  According to Bartels, “the views of constituents in the bottom
third of the income distribution received no weight at all in the voting deci-
sions of their senators.”61  These conclusions apparently mirrored another,
broader review released by Martin Gilens in 2005.  According to Bartels,
Gilens found that on “issues on which rich and poor people had divergent
preferences . . . the well-off were vastly more likely to see their views re-
flected in subsequent policy changes” than their economic inferiors.  Gilens
concluded, Bartels explains, “that ‘influence over actual policy outcomes
appears to be reserved almost exclusively for those at the top of the income
distribution.’” 62  This might help explain why massively wealthy fund man-
agers at private equity firms pay lower income tax rates than their
secretaries.63
My point, perhaps oddly, is not necessarily that Bartels and Gilens are
right—though I’m certain they are.  It is, instead, that I am confident most
law professors assume these empirical conclusions are apt to be accurate.
Three decades of conversations in faculty lounges across the country con-
vince me of at least that.  Even so, we press on with our mostly traditional
explorations of the law of property, contracts, torts, environmental law, se-
curities regulation, banking, corporate law, constitutional law, and the like—
though such economic disenfranchisement would seem to call into question
the underlying assumptions of and justifications for much in these varied
legal orders.  We master our allocated fields, publish our nuanced dis-
courses, produce our (we hope) law-firm-bound graduates, and press on.  We
assume, despite the purported underpinnings of the rule of law, that there is a
“rich people’s” and a “poor people’s” justice—realities that fly in the face
of our foundational, constituitive promises of equal participation.  But we
don’t explore the charade, we don’t measure it, we don’t criticize it, we don’t
attack it, and we don’t dwell on it.  Mostly, we don’t even mention it.  We’re
interested, apparently, in other things—though it is hard to imagine how our
professorial musings could rival in significance the purchase and subversion
of democratic prerogative.
58 Id. at 285.
59 Id. at 284.
60 Id. at 287.
61 Id. at 254.
62 Id. at 286 (quoting Martin Gilens, Inequality and Democratic Responsiveness, 69 PUB.
OPINION Q. 778, 794 (2005)).
63 See Editorial, The Unemployed Held Hostage, supra note 45, at A28 (noting an “egre-
gious tax loophole that allows wealthy fund managers at private equity firms and other invest-
ment partnerships to pay a top tax rate of just 15 percent on much of their earnings . . . .”).
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B. Access to the Civil Justice System
The legal academy is similarly inattentive to the largest shortcoming of
the actual operation of the American justice system—the denial of access
that results for the millions who cannot afford to pay the fare.  We know the
drill, or at least the tip of the nationally embarrassing iceberg.  Study after
now-repetitive study demonstrates that approximately eighty percent of the
legal need of the poor and near poor in the United States goes unmet.64  This
means, briefly put, that for about one-third of Americans—in a very broad
swath of legal disputes dealing with matters close to the core of human exis-
tence—despite the vaunted efforts of legal aid lawyers, pro bono volunteers,
and often-heroic non-profit advocates, no meaningful access to the civil jus-
tice system is afforded.  We claim “equal justice” as the literal linchpin of
our regime of constitutional adjudication.  What we do, however, has little in
common with what we say.
And, of course, we know it.  For almost eighty years, in the criminal
context, we have declared, flatly, that “the right to be heard would be, in
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel.”65  The Justices have declared it to be “an obvious truth” that any-
one “haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless one is provided.”66  This “obvious” verity escapes us in the
civil justice system, though it does not escape our peers around the world.
As one ABA resolution put it, “Most European and Commonwealth coun-
tries have had a right to counsel in civil cases for decades.”67  In rulings that
bind over forty nations and 800 million people,68 the European Court of
Human Rights has determined that, at least in complex cases, indigents will
not receive a fair hearing unless represented by counsel at public expense.69
We are not, as we sometimes pretend, mere disengaged, neutral arbiters
here.  We have created overarching tribunals, state and federal, that are the
only effective means of finally resolving a huge array of civil controversies.
64 See ABA House of Delegates, Resolution 112A 14 (2006) (“Most needs studies con-
clude the U.S. is already meeting roughly 20 percent of the need”), available at http://www.
abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf; KEN SCHORR & CAROL SPRUILL, THE
INITIAL REPORT OF THE NORTH CAROLINA EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMMISSION 8 (2008)
(explaining that in North Carolina, “[w]hen they need assistance with a civil legal matter,
over 80 percent of low-income people and people of modest means cannot afford to pay attor-
neys and are unable to secure representation by publicly funded attorneys or pro bono volun-
teers”), available at http://www.ncbar.org/download/probono/nceatjFullSummitReport.pdf;
Gene R. Nichol, Access to Civil Justice in North Carolina, 14 N.C. ST. B.J. 12, 12 (2009)
(“Over 80% of the legal need of the poor and near poor in North Carolina . . . is unmet”).
65 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). See also Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Judicial
Abdication and Equal Access to Civil Justice, 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 325 (2010).
66 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
67 ABA House of Delegates, supra note 64.
68 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRIEF 2
(2009), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/DF074FE4-96C2-4384-BFF6-404A
AF5BC585/0/Brochure_EN_Portes_ouvertes.pdf.
69 See Airey v. Ireland, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 305 (1979); Steel & Morris v. United
Kingdom, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R 22 (2005).
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We have also assured that they are complicated, mysterious, cumbersome,
professionally technical, adversarial, and expensive.  They are as far beyond
the ken of even intelligent laypersons as rocket science is to me.  We could,
of course, have done otherwise.  Even now it would be possible to dramati-
cally simplify the rules and resolution methods for large categories of dis-
putes, making the use of lawyers less necessary.  We have chosen not to do
so.  We’re responsible for the choice.
One might assume that this largest transgression of the American jus-
tice system would have made it to the heart of the variegated, three-year law
school curriculum.  Not so.  Nor is the pervasive exclusion of millions from
the effective implementation of the civil justice system a central focus of the
academic research of American law professors.  Deconstruction, cognitive
theory, anthropology, economic modeling, religious hermeneutics—of
course.  Rank, blatant, long-standing, and undeniable exclusion of poor peo-
ple?  Not so much.  They will, as it’s said, always be with us.
Most of legal education occurs as if there were no poor and near poor
persons in America.  Their effective exclusion from the actual implementa-
tion of so much of the civil justice system is swept unceremoniously aside.
In the halls of the legal academy, the poor are allowed simply to disappear—
as they do, typically, before the bench and the organized bar.  Economic
justice plays virtually no role in the exploration and aspiration of American
justice.  Economic privilege, however, sits securely center stage.
C. Legal Education Itself
Ignoring the impact of economic inequality on the development of legal
norms, or on the actual operation of the adjudication system, raises signifi-
cant questions about whether American legal education bends under the
weight of economic ascendancy.  It is also reasonable to ask whether the
structure of legal education itself—the frameworks, economies, and prac-
tices of American law schools—serves principally to foster and strengthen
economic privilege, rather than to criticize and call it to task in fulfillment of
democratic promise.  The answer is not heartening.
The cost of legal education, tied to either tuition or per-student expendi-
tures, has risen dramatically in the past several decades.  One broad-ranging
study indicated that average per-pupil spending at accredited law schools
had increased from $5,000 to over $20,000 between 1980 and 2000.70  In a
2009 report on higher education, the United States Government Accounta-
bility Office (GAO) concluded that public in-state law school tuition had
gone up by over seven percent a year, on average, from 1995 to 2008.  This
70 John A. Sebert, The Cost and Financing of Legal Education, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 516,
519 (2002).
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was, it reported, a good deal sharper than the experience in some other
branches of professional education.71
In 2008, the average public law school tuition was nearly $17,000 a
year for residents and over $28,000 for non-residents; average tuition at pri-
vate law schools exceeded $34,000.72  At least six public schools, remarka-
bly, charged over $30,000 for in-state students.73  The tuition at several
private schools exceeded $40,000 in 2008.74  One scholar has compared the
law school “tuition bubble” with the infamous sub-prime market crash.75
For students at public law schools who had taken out loans, the average debt
in 2007 was nearly $60,000; for students at private law schools, that figure
exceeded $90,000.76  A dramatic drop has occurred in the percentage of law
schools whose tuition burden can be met by low-interest Stafford loans.77
The executive director of the Association of American Law Schools, Dean
Susan Westerberg Prager, has fretted that middle-class access has been fa-
tally compromised.78  Kevin Johnson, the dean at the University of Califor-
nia, Davis School of Law, has indicated, more frankly, that “affordable
public legal education is no longer in existence.”79
This war on access is bad.  The reasons it has transpired are worse.  The
GAO study concluded that “[a more] resource-intensive approach to legal
education and competition among schools for higher rankings appear to be
the main factors driving law school cost.”80  Administrators at most ABA-
71 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HIGHER EDUCATION: ISSUES RELATED TO LAW
SCHOOL COST AND ACCESS 11, 16 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1020.
pdf.
72 ABA SECTION ON LEGAL EDUCATION, LAW SCHOOL TUITION (1985–2008) (2008),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legaled/statistics/charts/stats%20-%205.pdf.
73 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 29.
74 EQUAL JUSTICE WORKS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LIST OF LAW SCHOOL TUITION
AND FEES (2008), available at http://www.equaljusticeworks.org/files/aba_tuition_fees.pdf
(listing Columbia, Cornell, New York Law School, New York University, Northwestern, the
University of Southern California, and Yale as having tuitions over $40,000 in 2008).
75 Christine Hurt, Minding Our Own Business Forum: Bubbles, Student Loans and Sub-
Prime Debt, CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2010/04/death-
of-big-law-forum-bubbles-student-loans-and-subprime-debt.html (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library).
76 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 17.
77 Id. at 38.
78 Karen Sloan, At Public Law Schools, Tuition Jumps Sharply, NAT’L L. J., Aug. 3, 2009,
at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202432727154.  Of course, it is not
accurate to examine questions of access to legal education only by listing rising tuition bills.
Financial aid does, in many instances, render legal education affordable to those who could not
take advantage of it otherwise.  As one who has been both a law school dean and a public
university president, though, it has seemed clear to me that law schools, broadly speaking, do
not take need-based aid obligations with anything like the seriousness shown by thoughtful
undergraduate institutions.  The various efforts at Ivy League schools and some of the strong-
est public universities—like the University of North Carolina and the University of Virginia—
to assure that low and modest income students can graduate without debt have not been
matched by their respective law schools. And the skyrocketing average law school student loan
burden gives irrefutable testament to the fact that need-based aid in law schools is not keeping
pace—by a very wide margin—with dramatic and unwarranted tuition increases.
79 Id.
80 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 71, at 11.
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accredited law schools said that their efforts to boost their U.S. News and
World Report rankings had a major impact on tuition levels because
“[r]ankings are determined in part by such cost-related factors as per stu-
dent expenditures, student-faculty ratios, and library resources.”81  An em-
pirical study commissioned earlier by the Law School Admissions Council
similarly determined that the rankings have “created pressure on law schools
to redistribute resources in ways that maximize their [U.S. News and World
Report] scores . . . even if [law school officials] are skeptical that this is a
productive use of these resources.”82
This latter report listed massive marketing expenses to improve reputa-
tion, merit scholarships to compete for high LSAT students, huge dean and
faculty salaries, and spending to “game” (i.e., cheat) the system as causes
triggering dramatic cost acceleration.83  Any candid American law school
dean would add: significantly reduced faculty teaching loads, dramatically
expanded research and leave policies, imposing technological expenses,
showy physical facilities, and increased tuition dollars charged to redistrib-
ute to high-end merit scholarship recipients as drivers that dominate the
modern law school budgeting process.  What these causes have in common,
of course, is that they offer almost nothing to improve the actual educational
experience of law students.
Rising budgets have, though, made life a good deal more palatable for
those of us in the trade.  We have secured the highest, or among the highest,
salaries in the academy.84  Our research support, academic leave benefits,
and teaching loads have become extraordinarily and needlessly generous.85
At the same time, by dramatically increasing the cost of legal education,
81 Id. at 21. See also Eric Kelderman, Law-School Cost Is Pushed Up by Quest for Pres-
tige, Not Accreditation, GAO Survey Finds, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Oct 26, 2009), http://
www.chronicle.com/article/Competition-Not/48940 (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library).
82 MICHAEL SAUDER & WENDY ESPELAND,  LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS COUNCIL, FEAR OF
FALLING: THE EFFECT OF U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT RANKINGS ON U.S. LAW SCHOOLS 1
(2009), available at http://www.lsac.org/LSACResources/Research/GR/GR-07-02.pdf.
83 Id. See also Sebert, supra note 70, at 524–25 (“A more significant portion of the cost
increases is due to competition by law schools for students . . . and for reputational rankings
. . . . How can law schools avoid . . . the ‘positional arms race’ of ever increasing competition
for students, faculty and ranking, and the resulting rapidly increasing tuition costs and debt that
nonscholarship students bear?”); Deborah L. Rhode, Legal Education: Professional Interests
and Public Values, 34 IND. L. REV. 23, 25–26 (2000) (rankings “often distort law schools’
priorities; the temptation is to underinvest in features that U.S. News and World Report editors
find unimportant . . . .”).
84 See, e.g., Jack Crittenden, Why is Tuition Up? Look at All the Profs, NAT’L JURIST, Mar.
2010, at 40 (finding that law school faculty salaries have increased by 40% in the last decade,
accounting for an estimated 48% of the costs that have driven up tuition 102% at public law
schools and 71% at private schools); Richard A. Matasar, The Rise and Fall of American Legal
Education, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 465, 483 (2004) (noting that faculty hiring competitions,
increased benefit packages, and a greater focus on research “have only a tangential relation-
ship to the core education of law students . . . . [But they] are essential in the arms battle for
reputation.”); David Margolis, The Trouble With America’s Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
May 22, 1983, at 21 (reporting on law faculty salaries).
85 See Matasar, supra note 84, at 482–84.
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excluding more low- and middle-income students from enrolling, driving
debt rates through the ceiling, effectively closing off opportunities to work
in the public service, and indirectly elevating the ultimate cost of the deliv-
ery of legal services, we have contributed mightily, if unintentionally, to the
crisis in equal access to the justice system.  And the marginalization of the
concerns and interests of poor people is made notably easier and more “nat-
ural” in an academic setting in which almost no students of the most modest
economic means appear.  When we turn our gaze away, few will be expected
to notice.  We seem clearly to have served economic privilege, rather than to
have thwarted it.  And on this front, we have managed not only to foster the
fortunes of our most inordinately blessed students; we have secured an im-
pressive ascendancy for ourselves.  No chumps here.
CONCLUSION
I introduced the second half of this Foreword with reference to Richard
Trumka’s challenge to those who enjoy the happy coincidence of imposing
intellect and surpassing educational opportunity—to act as “critics” rather
than “servants” of “economic privilege.”  Robert Kennedy chided, simi-
larly, “history will judge [us] . . . on the extent to which [we] have used
[our] gifts to lighten and enrich the lives of [our] fellow man.”86
In one sense, of course, Trumka’s dialectic is too stark.  Some in the
legal academy, in perhaps modest numbers, press issues and causes of eco-
nomic injustice with passion, talent, and, on occasion, success.  Others, no
doubt, overtly embrace an exclusive sanctity for purportedly untrammeled
markets—rejecting accommodations to equality in favor of libertarian or
utilitarian aims.  But most law professors, no doubt, see themselves as adher-
ents of neither camp.  They need not be either critic or servant of economic
forces and hierarchies.  We don’t all see the world in similar ways.  We
needn’t all fight the same battles.  Sometimes, maybe most times, it is possi-
ble, even beneficial, just to let things alone.  And whether correct or not, that
is the way most of us actually lead our professional and intellectual lives.
Trumka, one might say, be damned.
The modest point with which I seek to conclude is that this untroubled
terrain becomes increasingly difficult, in authenticity and candor, to occupy.
It is hard for the piercing, objective student of legal norms to ignore the
reality that an overarching source of those norms, the United States Con-
gress, is demonstrably unresponsive to the claims and interests of millions of
low income Americans merely because they are low income Americans—
despite the purported guarantees of equal membership that undergird our
legal order’s legitimacy.  It is fanciful, and hugely inaccurate, to explore an
adjudicatory process premised on “equal justice under law” while omitting
86 Robert F. Kennedy, Address to Students at the University of California, Berkeley (Oct.
22, 1966), in RFK: COLLECTED SPEECHES 139 (Edwin O. Guthman & C. Richard Allen, eds.,
1993).
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from central consideration the knowing, pervasive, and accepted exclusion
of millions of poor citizens from the effective operation and implementation
of that process because they cannot afford to pay the fare.  It is hypocritical,
perhaps beyond measure, to operate a regime of legal education designed to
provide the democratizing influence of equal opportunity pursuant to profes-
sional standards in commitment to the rule of law, while magnifying plat-
forms of economic privilege for both faculty and the students they accredit.
It is impossible, in other words, to continue to escape the claim that we work
in service of economic privilege merely by closing our eyes.
